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It is increasingly clear that foreign debt is not likely to be  repaid as scheduled  unless
its servicing is facilitated by a transfer of technology and  resources,  and the opening of
international financial markets,  and/or a significant reduction  of the external debt  obligations
of debtor countries.  Given a diminishing  pool of resources available to the most indebted
countries,  new alternatives are needed.  These  alternatives fall into either of two categories:
political solutions (such as debt relief or debt  reduction),  and innovative financial solutions.
These financial innovations primarily include country funds,  venture  capital funds, and  debt
conversions (buybacks,  capitalization,  collateralization,  debt-to-equity swaps,'  debt-bond
swaps, equivalent funds, and debt repurchasing  funds).
This paper explores the economic arguments for and against financial innovations and
evaluates selected economic impacts  of these "solutions".  Our objectives are two-fold.
First,  we examine  how innovations (which originate in  private financial markets  in response
to the development  of secondary markets)  operate and potentially contribute to solving the
problem of excessive foreign debt.  Second,  we use  economic efficiency and financial
feasibility concepts to examine  the motivations  for a country to adopt a particular financial
alternative  such as debt-equity swaps.
Previous Studies
Sachs  (1  986a,  1987,  1989)  was one of the first economists  to advocate the need for
politically-oriented solutions,  such as debt reduction and debt relief.  Sachs analyzed the
strategy supported  by creditor governments  regarding the debt  problem  (that is, servicing
commercial  bank claims  by debtor countries).  He pointed out the approach  is unlikely to
permit  resumption  of significant economic growth  in debtor countries.  Sachs asserts  debt
will not be  repaid unless its servicing implies a transfer  of technology and  resources and
opening of new markets for the exports of debtor countries and suggests two non-mutually
exclusive approaches.  One approach is debt relief,  which implies partial or total forgiveness
of principal and/or interest payments for those countries which have suffered large  losses of
income  and living standards as a result of the debt crisis.  The other approach is based  on
augmenting capital flows,  allowing the  entrance of new lenders  on a senior basis.
Debt-to-equity  swaps will be variously referred to as swaps,  debt swaps, and  debt-equity
swaps.
*  Graduate student and  Associate Professor,  respectively, Department  of Agricultural  and
Applied  Economics,  University of Minnesota.
1Bender  (1988) examined  several financial  instruments and their usefulness in
overcoming the debt crisis.  He  suggested a macroeconomic  evaluation  of the efficiency  of
financial innovations  in  reducing the  debt burden.  Bender's analysis of debt-equity swaps,
debt-bond  swaps, equivalent funds,  and debt-repurchasing funds casts some  doubts on the
usefulness  of financial innovations  in restoring debtors'  creditworthiness.  The main  problems
these innovations face is the existence  of significant negative  side effects when monetary
and fiscal requirements  cannot be satisfied.  Consequently,  he suggests the need  for
structural adjustment programs  in order for these instruments to make  significant
contributions toward resolving the  debt problem.
Regling  (1988) analyzed the  inter-related  nature of these financial innovations through
a 'menu approach'.  This approach  was implemented  in  1987  and offers a range of options
to both creditors  and debtor countries while encouraging  continued participation by banks in
the effort to overcome  the debt crisis.  It combines traditional financing  modalities (currency
denomination,  interest rate options,  interest retiming,  on-lending and  re-lending, new credit
facilities, co-financing, debt conversion,  and secondary  market transactions)  with more
recent innovations  (fees,  alternative participation  instruments,  securitization,  prioritization,
interest capitalization, and debt buybacks).
Blackwell  and Nocera  (1988)  focused on the analysis of economic impacts  of
debt-equity conversion.  Although  swaps may contribute to alleviate the  debt burden  by
making  debt servicing  more manageable  and new investment more  attractive,  they suggest
there are  still significant limitations imposed by fiscal and monetary  considerations.
WIDER  (1989)  examined aspects such as the objectives, resource  requirements,  and
techniques  of debt reduction  and the participation  by banking creditors in  the process.  The
link between  these measures  and policy reforms,  and the incentives for new flows of funds
to debtor countries through  'credit  enhancement'  techniques (e.g.,  guarantees of multilateral
and bilateral  lenders) were  explored.
Borenztein  (1989)  provided an interesting  theoretical framework to examine the
effect of debt on  investment.  He argues that foreign debt affects investment through two
non-mutually  exclusive channels: debt overhang  and credit rationing.2 Debt acts as a foreign
tax on current and future  production which weakens the  incentive to invest and encourages
capital flight.  Credit  rationing arises because  of the debtor's inability to gain access to
international financial markets.  Consequently,  domestic interest rates  will lie above
international rates  and adversely affect the  level of investment in  the country.
Finally,  Van der  Bijl  (1990)  focused on the most  recent instruments,  such as country,
portfolio,  and venture capital funds as they apply to developing countries.  These funds
consist of pooled  investment vehicles developed  by the  International  Finance  Corporation
(IFC).
2 Debt overhang occurs when,  as a result of the debtor country's inability to honor its debt
in full,  debt-servicing  is dictated  by a negotiation  process between  the debtor country and  its
creditors (or a multilateral international financial institution) rather than by the contractual terms
of the  debt.  Actual  payments  are  determined  by  the  debtor's  economic  performance.  If this
performance  improves,  creditors realize  part of the return  in the form of higher debt payments.
2Latin America's  External  Debt Problem
During  the great lending  rush of the  1970s, creditor institutions (mostly large
commercial  US  banks)  worried  little whether it was riskier to lend to Argentina,  Brazil,  or
Mexico.  That  is, "country  risks"  did not constitute a major source of concern.  Financial
analysts and economists  have subsequently  learned about the  problems to  be addressed in
Latin America,  a region that has been  rapidly changing.  In  the  1990s,  creditors will likely
concentrate their resources in countries that have  undertaken  genuine liberalizing  reforms and
have consistently tried to honor their external  debt commitments.
In  this context, liberalizing reforms  imply the rejection of the protectionist command
economy model  and adoption of a diversified, export-oriented strategy founded on
deregulation,  privatization of industry, and  liberalization of trade and  investment policies.
These  strategies are  being  implemented  in countries such as  Bolivia,  Chile, Costa  Rica and,
more  recently,  Argentina,  Brazil  and Mexico.  The countries that are likely to make  the
greatest advances  in economic development  in the 1990s will be those that  have already
implemented  realistic economic policies and  built a consensus favoring their maintenance.
Once the international community  is convinced that these substantial reforms  will be
meaningful and  permanent,  new money may naturally flow to these nations.
It is widely accepted that the best solution to the debt problem  from a long-term
perspective  is an increase  in foreign direct investment  (Latin American  Financial  Publications
1989b).  Investors take a long-term view of the market  and emphasize the manner in which
the country's  debt problem  is being  managed.  Thus,  proper debt management  is essential in
order to attract foreign investment.  Foreign  investment  packages can  also make  significant
contributions to development through  the transfer of technology, production  and
management  skills in addition to international sales capabilities.
In  general, the political and economic realities that determined  past debt repayment
behavior are good indicators of future  country risk, including chances  of expropriation.
Therefore,  it is likely that loans will be directed  towards self-amortizing,  well-collateralized
private  investment projects.  Latin  American  countries will  be considered creditworthy when
bank officials have been  persuaded that new loans will  be repaid,  and not because  loans
have  been paid off in the past.
Thus far, a widespread  strategy of case-by-case negotiation  has focused on the
maintenance of the status quo  (i.e.,  maintaining the servicing of commercial banks claims by
debtor countries3).  This is motivated by the prospect of a major financial disaster.  A
generalized  repudiation  by debtor countries would  have seriously threatened the solvency of
the banks, since the world's largest commercial  banks had exposures that typically exceeded
100 percent of bank capital.4 Creditors received  large net transfers from  debtor countries
during the  1980s due to the willingness of the creditor governments to put official funds into
debtor countries  whenever necessary in  order to make interest payments.
3 This  strategy  pivoted  around  rescheduling  existing debt  (principal)  without  interrupting
interest payments, and without extending new lines of credit to problem debtors (Sachs  1986,
1989).
4  Sachs  (1986b)  showed  that  in  December,  1985,  the  exposure  (capital  versus
nonperforming  assets) of the nine largest  US  banks in  all non-oil  LDCs  was  148 percent.  The
comparable exposure in Latin America  was  125 percent.
3Measures  in Table 1 reflect changes  in the  debt-service burden  in Latin America
between  1970 and  1987.  For most economies,  debt service rose throughout the early
1980s and peaked  around  1987.  The trend in the  1990s is expected  to be for a further
gradual  reduction of these percentages.  However, the debt burden will  remain  heavier than
the  levels of the  1970s.  This is because a reduction  in debt-servicing requirements  is a
necessary,  but not a sufficient, condition for the economic take-off of these troubled
economies.  Even  with a considerable reduction  in debt service obligations, the debt burden
will still be highly significant as long as the  level of economic activity  (measured  by GNP)
remains stagnant and export prices continue to fall.
The Baker  Plan (introduced  in  1985)  and the  Brady Plan  (introduced  in  1989)  were
proposals to address the debt  problem.  The Baker  Plan proved to  be insufficient since it did
not attack the  core problem,  excessive debt.  It endorsed case-by-case  negotiations and debt
rescheduling  (not debt-reduction)  tied to economic reforms  under the guidance of the
International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF).  The Brady  Plan  was the first to recognize that the debt
burden was too high to be repaid.  In essence,  the  Brady Plan  called on  U.S.  commercial
banks to accept an  orderly process of debt reduction  (i.e.,  recognition that all  debt could  not
be possibly repaid).
Some of the debt restructuring  options under the  Brady  Plan included buybacks  using
cash reserves,6 debt conversion and guarantees, 6 and debt-equity  swaps.  Although it
pointed  in the  right direction, the  Brady Plan  was not enough.  It advocated  a twenty percent
debt reduction  which has  proven to be  insufficient to solve the  problems for many countries.
Some debtors  (Costa  Rica,  Mexico,  the  Philippines and Venezuela)  benefitted from the  plan.
Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile,  and Peru  needed  new alternatives to alleviate the burden of the debt.
Large  and urgent social demands  in those countries could not be satisfied in  the short run in
the  absence of major structural  reforms.  Implementation  of these needed  reforms  could
postpone the  resumption of economic growth.  Without substantial debt reduction, vigorous
economic growth,  and more equitable  income distribution the  region would also remain
politically unstable.
Given the problem  of unserviceable,  excessive debt, a fundamental  question needs to
be addressed.  Is it in the best interest of a country to drive down the  value of its foreign
debt?  If one focuses on the immediate  benefits to the  debtor country the answer seems to be
yes.  Costa  Rica is a good  example.  By withholding interest payments to creditors and
pushing down the  secondary market  value of its debt to  15-20 percent,  Costa  Rica
negotiated  a larger debt reduction deal  than Argentina  or Mexico (where punctual payment
policies kept prices around 40 percent).  Bolivia cashed  in its debt for  11  cents on the  dollar.
To better understand why those large differentials occur we  need to identify the
determinants  of external debt  valuation.  The value of the debt in the secondary market  is a
function of 1) the political environment,  2)  the risk qualification  of the debtor country, 3) the
absolute amount  (principal) of the debt,  4) current and forecasted  economic conditions in the
debtor country, and  5) the  situation in  international  financial markets.
6 For  example,  Bolivia bought  back much  of its debt on the  secondary market  at  10 cents
on the dollar.
a For example,  Poland  converted  $ 5  million  in  debt  at  11  percent  to  $ 2.5  million  at  11
percent.  In Nigeria, the amount of debt remained at $ 5 million, but the interest rate was reduced
to 5.5 percent.
4Table  1:  Alternative  Measures  of  Actual  Debt  Servicing
in Latin America,  1970 and  1987
Debt Service  as a Percentage of:
Country  GNP  Exports
1970  1987  1970  1987
-------  --- perc  ent----  ----
Argentina  2.1  5.1  21.6  45.3
Bolivia  2.3  3.3  11.3  22.1
Brazil  6.9  2.4  12.5  26.7
Chile  3.1  7.9  19.2  21.1
Colombia  1.7  7.0  11.7  33.4
Costa Rica  2.9  4.5  10.0  12.1
Guatemala  1.4  4.2  7.4  24.9
Mexico  1.9  6.4  23.6  30.1
Panama  3.1  7.5  7.7  6.5
Peru  2.0  1.0  11.6  12.5
Uruguay  2.7  5.6  21.7  24.4
Venezuela  0.6  5.9  2.9  22.6
Source:  The World Bank
5If the debtor government  policies are credible, and the current and prospective
economic conditions  (such as the inflation rate,  the rate of growth  of GNP, and the level of
unemployment)  are favorable, the  secondary market  value of the debt will increase  (the
discount will decrease).  Compare,  for instance,  the  situations of Chile and  Bolivia.  The
higher market  value of the  Chilean debt ($.60  on the  dollar compared  to  $.11  on the dollar
for Bolivia) reflects the  more stable political and economic conditions of the  former.
Conversely,  the market  value of debt will  decrease if either the absolute amount of
outstanding obligations, or the risk qualification of the country increases.  Finally, the  market
value of the  debt is expected to  be inversely related to the  international excess supply of
funds.
Financial Instruments
Most financial innovations applied to the  debt problem fall into one of three
categories:
Country  (or portfolio) funds;





debt-equity  swaps,  and
debt-bond swaps).
Country or portfolio funds,  as opposed to direct investment,  are innovations that
diversify investors'  country-risk by allocating pools of funds in  the fast-growing economies  of
industrializing countries.  These  instruments,  mainly developed  by the International  Finance
Corporation  (IFC)  owe their success to the  increasing  internationalization  of securities
markets and the  increase in the  volume of funds at the  disposal of institutional investors.
This improvement  in international  liquidity has made it possible to  implement direct
investment  in  Korea,  Thailand,  Malaysia and  Brazil.  However,  country funds are  more
difficult to apply in other highly indebted  countries such as Argentina  and  Mexico.
Commercial  viability, supply of liquid securities, transparency  and injection of substantial new
funds can  greatly affect the  attractiveness of this alternative for potential  investors  (Van  Der
Bijl,  1990).
Venture capital funds are  pooled investment variations of venture  capital
investments.  These  funds were  also initiated by the  IFC  and are  primarily intended to provide
institutional support for entrepreneurship  in LDCs.  Their contribution to a solution of the  debt
crisis is long-term.  The success of these  ventures,7 and the consequent flow of productive
capital to indebted countries,  can contribute significantly to the solution of the economic
stagnation in  debtor nations.
7 Venture  capital funds have been  implemented  in  Spain  Ithe first in  1978),  the Philippines,
Brazil,  Korea,  Kenya,  Argentina,  and Cote  d'lvoire.
6Broadly defined,  debt conversion mechanisms are intended to convert external debt
into a  domestic liability (debt capitalizations and  buybacks) or into equity (debt-equity swaps)
of the borrower  country.  The most common  variations  of debt conversion are  briefly
described here.
Debt capitalization  involves the  exchange by a  creditor of the  external debt (of a
borrower) for equity (of the same  borrower).  No cash payment  takes place.  A  common
vehicle in  Latin America  is that of privatization (i.e.,  the sale of a state-owned  enterprise to
private investors).  Under these programs,  a debtor government exchanges its interest in  a
state-owned  enterprise for debt titles, thereby reducing its debt.  For example,  under a recent
agreement the Argentine  government  sold ENTEL,  the country's state-owned telephone
company,  to an international  consortium headed  by Telefonica  (Spain)  and Atlantic  Bell
(U.S.).  Under  the terms of the  agreement,  Telefonica will pay $468 million  for its 10  percent
share  in the south region.  About $114  million will be paid  in cash and the  remaining  $354
million  in titles of Argentina's foreign debt with a face value of $2.7 billion).8
Since the market price of these  enterprises is generally lower than their book value,
these initiatives face political opposition.  For example,  in 1988 the Argentine  Congress
soundly defeated  a  preliminary agreement between the government and  Scandinavia's  SAS,
that provided for the privatization  of the  state airline.  Currently,  initiatives to privatize YPF,
the  large state oil firm, and  Ferrocarriles Argentinos, the railroad monopoly,  face strong
worker and  management  opposition.
Buybacks  constitute the simplest form of debt reduction.  The borrower  simply
repurchases external  debt at a  discount from  a willing seller.  The issue here is the origin of
the resources necessary  to finance the purchase.  Private residents would provide funds  if
the country were pursuing credible  stabilization policies that  encouraged  a  reversal of capital
flight.  This would be  the case  of a  pure  debt-cash swap.  The resident acquires foreign
currency debt and  redeems it in local currency.  Proceeds from World  Bank structural
adjustment loans or IMF credits could  provide the funds needed.  An  IMF buyback fund
would work as a repurchasing fund  (resources  in this case  could be  made available through
an increase in  quota  arrangements).  For example,  if debt is being traded at a  40 percent
discount in the  secondary market,  the debtor  country would  be able  to buy back each dollar
of debt  borrowing only 60 cents from the  IMF,  consequently reducing the burden  of the  debt.
The appeal  of this approach  relies on its simplicity.  It provides  a  permanent solution
that many creditors would readily accept.  Impaired  assets would  be definitely removed from
creditor balance sheets and the mechanism  is endorsed  by an  international monetary
institution.  However, funding the  scheme confronts  an important obstacle.  Residents are
generally reluctant to provide  resources while many  IMF members  would not allow an
increase  in their quotas.  Since the  program  is ultimately based  on international  creation of
money it would increase the potential for international  inflation.9
0 La Nacion,  Buenos Aires, July 3,  1990.
9 The IMF  recently announced an  increase of $60 billion in  its budget. A significant portion
is directed to help Latin  American  economies.
7Collateralization  involves an  exchange of old debt for a new collateralized  liability.
This new liability typically has one or more  of the following characteristics:  lower interest
rate,  reduced amount  of principal, and/or longer term.  The collateral can be  provided in the
form of deposits or in the form of bonds  (a debt-bond swap).  This alternative  may be
appealing to commercial  banks.  If they are willing to accept  a  lower rate, the interest stream
is secured  and,  therefore,  low-risk.  One problem  is where the  resources for the  collateral
would come from  (the IMF  has been  identified  as one source of collateral).  Also,  deposits
must be  secure (offshore).  Therefore,  creditors would need  an arrangement  outside the
borrowing country which is immune  from freezing  and offsetting claims.
Debt-equity conversion  has been the major  vehicle for debt  reduction so far.  Under a
debt swap, external  sovereign debt  is purchased  by an  investor directly from a  creditor bank
or indirectly through the secondary market.  The debt is presented for redemption  in local
currency for a subsequent equity investment in the debtor country.  Thus, the bank loan  is
converted  into share capital.
Debt swaps have  become a  pivotal issue in Latin  American  debt negotiation.  Swaps
may constitute  an efficient investment  incentive in the  sense that they  reduce debt  ratios and
catalyze  new investment without  negative effects on the balance of payments  of the  debtor
country.  Bergsman  and Edisis' 1 found debt swaps to be a  determining  factor in one-third  of
the investments  made  by multi-nationals  in  several  Latin  American  countries.  Unlike
buybacks and  collateralization schemes  debtor countries do not need  additional resources  in
order to encourage  debt-equity conversion.  Problems arise  when the monetary  impact of the
swap program  is significant, or when there  is a big gap  in the rate  of exchange.  Successful
balance of payments and anti-inflationary  adjustments  are difficult to achieve in  Latin
American  economies.  Monetary  problems  such as inflation, higher  domestic interest rates
and reduced consumption are  common. T "
Debt-bond  swaps are similar to debt-equity  swaps.  The main  difference  is that  bond
swaps exchange foreign debt for tradable fixed-interest bonds.  For example,  in 1987 Mexico
issued a $10  billion bond with  a  20-year maturity to secure a transaction  through which
Mexico  paid  $1.87 billion for a $10  billion zero-coupon U.S.  Treasury bond with the same
maturity.  The  Mexican  bond was accepted  by the creditor banks in exchange for  Mexican
debt totalling  $14.3 billion,  thus reducing  Mexico's debt  by $4.3 billion.  Although creditors
would  likely prefer this secured and  liquid instrument  instead  of other alternatives,  only a
small  proportion of developing country's debt  has been converted  to bonds.
Several Latin American countries have  implemented  variations of the general scheme
of a  debt conversion.  Most of these  are rather new.  The oldest conversion schemes  (Brazil
and  Chile) have  been  in place for only about five years.  Table 2  contains a summary of debt
conversion history in  Latin America  during the  1980s.  Brazil and  Mexico have implemented
the most  comprehensive conversion  programs.  They alone account for 72 percent  (34
percent and  38 percent, respectively)  of the  total debt that was converted.  Chile and
10  Bergsman  and  Edisis  examined  101  debt-equity swap  transactions  in  Argentina,  Brazil,
Chile,  and  Mexico and found that 54  percent of the  projects aimed  to  export markets  were  a
direct result of the incentive created by the swap (Latin American  Finance Publications  1989a).
"  The recent  experiences of Argentina  and  Brazil are  examples.
8Table  2:  Debt  Conversion  History  of
Latin America,  1981-1988
1981-84  1985  1986  1987  1988  Total
Country:  - - - - ...  (us $  million)  - - - - - - - -
Argentina  0  470  0  35  1273  1763
Bolivia  0  0  0  0  349  349
Brazil  1343  537  176  1380  8476  12412
Chile  11  319  984  1978  3205  6497
Costa Rica  0  0  7  146  na  170
Ecuador  0  0  0  125  245  370
Mexico  0  769  1073  3768  8402  14012
Philippines  0  0  15  266  304  585
Venezuela  0  0  0  0  448  448
Total  1354  2095  2255  8198  22719  36607
Type  of
Conversion:
Straight  0  0  0  0  648  648
Buybacks
Exit Bonds  0  0  0  15  5125  5140
Equity  1354  1380  1541  3517  7010  14801
Other  0  715  714  4667  9937  16032
Source:The  World  Bank
9Argentina  represent  18 and  5 percent,  respectively,  of the total  debt conversions.  Equity
programs account for 40 percent of the  total debt converted  during  1981-88.  Total volume
more than doubled two years in  a row (from  1986 to  1987  and from  1987  to 1988).  Chile
exhibits the most successful experience in  retiring its external debt through the  swap
mechanism.  Chile  retired  $7  billion, reducing its debt by 30 percent  (from $24 to $17
billion).  If one were simply to extrapolate  the 1981-88  figures, the trend  is for a greater
volume of debt-equity  conversions in the  1990s.  This trend could be  driven by the
continuation and  expansion of liberalizing economic  reforms  undertaken  in  most Latin
American countries.
Illustration of the Debt-Equity  Swap Mechanism
A typical debt swap transaction consists of a three-step  sequence.  First,  creditor
banks  are offered  an option  to sell their outstanding  claims  on a  debtor country.  Second,
potential  investors buy (finance)  part of those claims  paying the price prevailing  in the
secondary debt market.  Finally, the debtor government  cancels the external  liabilities
involved in  the transaction.
Figure  1 is a simplified  illustration of the mechanics of a debt-equity swap.  Suppose
a creditor bank holds a  bond from a typical debtor country with a face  value (F) of $1.
Assume this debt  is traded  at a discount of 40 percent  in the corresponding  secondary
market.  A foreign  investor, interested  in a  specific project in the debtor country,  is offered  a
debt-equity swap  as a  financing option.  The  investor acquires the  outstanding debt from the
creditor bank  by paying the market  price (M)  of $.6012,  which  is the  value of the debt title
in the secondary  market.  The investor submits  the investment  project for evaluation to the
monetary authority  (i.e., the  Central  Bank) in the debtor country.  The Central  Bank evaluates
the proposal  and  either accepts or rejects it.  If the project is approved, the  investor sells the
title of the debt to the monetary  authority  at face value  or at a  discount D,  (10%  in  this
example).  The monetary authority pays $.90  (F-D  = $1-$.10)  in local currency at a
predetermined  rate  of exchange.
For the investor, the swap creates  an  incentive to invest in the form of a  reduction in
the total cost of the investment.  In the above example, this reduction  is $.30  (F-De-M),  the
difference  between the amount effectively invested  ($.90) and  its cash outlay or payment to
the  creditor bank ($.60).  The greater the discount of debt in the secondary market,  or the
lower the discount offered  by the monetary  authority,  the  more attractive the  program  is to
the  investor.
A reduction  in the initial cost of the investment  simultaneously increases the project's
rate of return and  reduces the absolute amount that the  investor has  at risk.  This is an
implicit subsidy given  by a  more favorable effective  rate  of exchange  for every dollar
invested.  This constitutes a  key difference  between  swaps and other financial  innovations.
A numerical  example is useful to clarify the  impact of the  subsidy on the  return to an
investor.
12  For simplicity, all figures are  in terms of a dollar face value.  Thus,  a  40 percent discount
implies  a secondary market  price of  $.60 per dollar of face  value.
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Figure  1:  Mechanics  of a  Debt-Equity  Swap
11If the government  purchases the  $1 face-value  instrument at a discount D9 of 10
percent, the instantaneous  rate of return  (RO)  to the investor can  be interpreted  as a return
due to a reduction  in the amount effectively  paid.  We  denote this rate of return as r,.
r,  =  (F-Do-M)/M  =  ((1-(.10)-(.60))/.60  =  .5013
The investor receives the  face value minus the  discount (F-D 0) converted  at the
official rate  of exchange  Eo.  Assume the official  rate  of exchange to be A4.20  (Argentinean
australes  per dollar).  In this example,  the investor receives A3.78 (($1-$.10)xA4.20) in
exchange for the  $.60 invested.
There  are two important effects  that can affect the attractiveness of the swap for a
potential investor.  The first of these  is the volatility of ROI with respect to the exchange rate
gap.  This  gap is defined  as the  difference  between the market exchange rate  (E,) and the
official  exchange  rate  (Eo).  For example,  if the  unregulated  (market)  rate is A4.80, the
purchasing power of the  investment in the  domestic  market (M, expressed in australes)  is
now A2.88 (.60xA4.80)  instead  of the  original A4.20.  In  this case,  the  ROI is significantly
lower than the  original (no  gap) case.
r2 =  (F-D,)  (E.)  - (M)  (Em)
(M)  (Em)
=  (1-.10)(4.20)-(.60)(4.80)  =  .31
(.60)(4.80)
The  19 percent  difference between  the two returns  (rl and  r2) can  be interpreted  as
an  efficiency cost due to imperfections  in the foreign  currency market  in the debtor country.
This cost  can  be so high that some investors  will forego  the investment  project.
A profit maximizing investor theoretically compares  the  project's ROI with the
opportunity cost of capital when  deciding whether  or not to invest in a particular  project.  For
example,  if the opportunity cost of capital is  11  percent,  an increase of 35 percent  in the  gap
(to A5.68) would  be sufficient to make  the investor indifferent between  pursuing the project
or not.
r2'  =  (1-.10)(4.20)-(.60)(5.68)  =  .11
(.60)(5.68)
A second significant effect results from the requirement of additional funds (known
as new  money or matching funds).  For example,  if one additional dollar is required over the
original cash outlay, the  total outlay required  to purchase the  $2 face value becomes  $1.60
(M').  The adjusted  purchasing  power is A7.68 (1.60x4.80).  Assuming  no discount the  ROI
is
r3 =  2(F)(Eo)-(M')(Em)
(M')(Em)
13  Note that this rate  of return  is exactly the same  when computed  in australes.
12=  2(1)(4.20)-(1.60)(4.80)  =  .094
(1.60)(4.80)
Again, the investor compares this return with the cost of capital and decides whether or not to  proceed with the project.
For the creditor bank conversion programs  offer an  opportunity to diversify, restructure  and reduce  debtor country portfolios.  By selling debt titles (just as it would sell them  on the  secondary market)  the bank can enhance  the liquidity of its loan assets.  The cost of this transaction  occurs when the bank waives part of the value  of the loan and realizes  the loss ($.40).  Most banks establish  provisions against their debt portfolios for these contingencies.  However, tax incentives may be necessary  to induce management  of many banks to write off debt claims,  since the impact on short-term  earnings could  be highly significant.  If such  incentives are not available, banking  regulators may force  banks to write off loans  in order to  reduce exposure.  For example,  the  Interagency  Country  Exposure Review  Committee  recently forced the largest  U.S.  banks to write off (as  a  loss) 20 percent of their loans to Brazil and  increase their write-offs  of loans to Argentina from  40 to  60 percent. '4
Criteria for Evaluation of Alternatives
From  a  country perspective,  an initiative  intended to alleviate the debt  problem  could be evaluated from  at least two angles: financial feasibility and economic efficiency.
An  instrument  is considered financially feasible if there  are no significant restrictions that would limit or prohibit its practical implementation.  Specific economic and regulatory conditions frequently constitute the most important  limiting factors in this respect.  In particular,  an instrument  will be considered financially feasible if the following  conditions are satisfied.
a)  A  liquid market exists for the  instrument.  The recent development  of secondary markets allows for an institutional and structured trading
place where debtor countries'  foreign  debt can  be traded.  However,
the mere  existence of these  markets  does not guarantee  an
instrument's feasibility.  It is also necessary that the  instrument be liquid (i.e.,  marketable).
b)  Financial  transaction procedures are simple and transparent.
Cumbersome  and confusing  procedures may fail to attract  potential
investors.
c)  Foreign  investment laws and regulations within the debtor country are favorable  for the adoption of a  particular financial innovation.  This  is closely related to  b).  If a  country imposes constraints on the
remittance  of dividends, investors may be reluctant to undertake  a
particular program  due to the implied higher transactions costs and
reduced rates of return.
t4 The Wall  Street Journal, July  12,  1990.
13d)  The instrument  is effectively available.  Obviously, if an  instrument  is
not available it is unfeasible.  For example,  Country  Funds  are
instruments yet unavailable to  many debtor countries.
Given the set of desirable objectives to be  achieved by the adoption of a particular
financial innovation,  such an  innovation is  economically efficient if it is able to generate
favorable results with  respect to at least one  of the objectives without  producing negative
effects with respect to the others.  The improvement  in at least one of the conditions is an
'economic  gain' derived from  selecting a particular alternative  over the  others.  From  a
macroeconomic  perspective, these gains may include monetary,  fiscal, and  balance of
payments effects.
In  general, financial  innovations can  be evaluated  according to their contribution to
two major and  related economic objectives:  reduction  in the  debt burden and resulting  new
investment.  Following  Bender  (1988),  equilibrium  in the  balance of payments  requires
Trade  _  Interest  =  Net  Capital
Surplus  Payments  Exports
As a mathematical  expression,  we  have
(X-M)-r'D  =  Kx-Km  (1)
where
X  =  exports
M  =  imports
r  =  interest rate  (LIBOR  plus a risk premium)
D  =  total debt
K x =  capital exports
Km  =  capital imports
Assume that capital exports are equivalent to debt  (principal) repayments  at a rate c (i.e.,  no
capital flight occurs).  Further,  assume  that capital imports include new  borrowing  (D')  plus
new foreign investment  (I').  Then
Kx  =  c'D
Km  =  D'+l'.
By substitution from  (2)  into (1) we can write
(X-M)-(r+c)*D  +  (D'+I')  =  0  (2)
Next,  we can  define the change  in foreign indebtedness as
AD  =  D'  - cD  =  KM  - I' - cD.  (3)
That is, the change in  level of indebtedness is the residual after subtracting  new foreign
investment  and debt capital  repayment from capital imports.  The resulting need  for new
foreign borrowing,  D',  is similarly defined as
D'  =  (M-X)  +  (r+c) D - I'  (4)
14where the right side of  (4) includes the trade account deficit, foreign debt repayment,  and new foreign investment,  respectively.
By defining the  rate  of change in foreign debt as  d( =  D'/D),  and substituting for D' from  (4) we have
d  =  (r+c) - (X-M)  - I'  (5)
D  D
Therefore,  the  rate of foreign debt increase  (or decrease)  will be associated with three component  rates - the  rate of debt amortization, the  rate at which trade surpluses (deficits) are  generated,  and the rate  at which  new foreign investment flows  into (out of) the debtor county.
Finally, we  can derive a corresponding  interpretation  of the factors that  increase the foreign debt ratio  (and, the corresponding debt servicing burden).16  If we define the debt ratio as D/X,  the expression for the  rate of change in the debt  ratio can  be stated  as AD  - AX =  d-x.  If interest  rates and capital  repayment  rates  are fixed,  the rate  of change in the  debt ratio is
(d-x)  =  (r+c-x) - (X-M)  - I'  (6)
D  D
Therefore,  reduction  of the debt burden  can  be achieved by the satisfaction  of any or all of the following three conditions:  1) the  simultaneous reduction  of effective interest rates  and rapid growth  of exports such that (r+c<x), 2)  the existence of a surplus in the balance  of payments trade  account (X-M>0),  and 3) the attraction of foreign investment (I'/D>0).  A financial instrument can  be  considered economically efficient in reducing the  debt burden if it produces favorable  results with respect to at least one of these aspects  without generating negative effects with respect to the others.
According to Borenztein  (1989),  the  effect of a particular instrument  in attracting new investment will depend  on the relative effects of debt overhang  and credit rationing  on productive  investment.  Although  any initiative may affect both  debt overhang and  credit rationing,  its effects  may have a greater incidence  on one or the other.  For example,  debt reduction  instruments such as buybacks and  swaps will likely reduce debt overhang but may not alleviate credit rationing.  New  loans can  ease foreign borrowing constraints and  the conditions underlying  credit rationing but may not improve debt overhang. 6
Finally, there  is a third aspect that should be addressed when evaluating the appropriateness of financial innovations.  The issue of political viability has proven to be  a major determinant  in the decision by debtor governments to adopt a particular strategy
16  We could define the debt-servicing  burden as  s  =  (r+c) D/X.
1e  According to Borenztein,  additional lending has a significant positive effect on productive investment.  Debt reduction does not have a major impact on investment as long  as the country lacks access to international financial markets.  He concludes that credit rationing is the leading force which inhibits investment.
15regarding the  debt problem.  A dominant issue  is that of foreign ownership  and control of
domestic assets.  For  example,  Argentina  does  not allow swaps to be used for privatization
initiatives while Chile and  Mexico do.
The Case  of Argentina,  1988
The Argentine Government  implemented  its debt-to-equity conversion program  during
1987-88.  The main  objective was to create a  lasting  program  intended to facilitate  new
productive  investments  which would not otherwise  be made  (see the Appendix for an
overview of the principal features of the program).
Tables  3 and 4 summarize the  results of Argentina's  1988 auctions.  With  only minor
(formal) changes,  the conversion procedure  was adjusted to the norms and  regulations
described above.  The Central  Bank defined a minimum  required  discount rate for conversion
of public debt.  After projects  were submitted for evaluation,  the bank awarded  the period
quota  on the basis of the discount offered.
As can be  seen in Table 3,  discounts increased  over time.  Discounts on public debt
ranged  from 38 percent  (in the first auction) to 66 percent  (in the  fourth).  Comparable
discounts on  private debt varied from  15 to 28 percent.  This constitutes a clear indicator  of
the  success of the program  in this first stage.  Average  returns  were  substantially higher than
the  opportunity cost of capital.  After the program  proved to work properly, eligible  projects
were engaged  in  increasingly stronger  competition for the available  quota.  This occurred
even though the  market price of Argentina's  debt was declining.
A total of $211.4 million was  converted through  public debt auctions into equity from
a pool of investment projects  worth $530.4 million  (Table 4).  The  difference  between both
figures is due to deductions  (mainly imports of durable  goods,  $ 186.9 million) and  additional
funds ($133  million).  Investor cash outlays amounted  to  $319 million,  so that the effective
investment  (cash outlay plus the $126.2  million market  value of debt) added  up to $445.2
million.  Investors gained approximately  $85  million, the difference  between the  value of
projects and the effective investment.  This is about  16 percent of the total value of
investments.  The government  earned  $243.2 million which is the difference  between the
face  value of the debt to be converted  1$454.6 million) and the amount  eligible for
conversion ($211.4 million).  At an average  interest rate on debt of  11  percent, this
represents a  reduction of almost  $50 million  in the total annual interest payments.  Creditors
had to write down the difference  between the face value and the market  price of the  debt
($328.4  million).
In summary,  Argentina's external  debt was reduced by $211.4 million  without any
apparent cost to the government.  This represented  a  reduction of approximately  3 percent  in
the  estimated  $65 billion of external  obligations.  Given the low amounts involved,  the
monetary expansion (approximately  $2.7 billion in  5 years)  generated by the  program should
not have  been  of great concern.  Although the  Central  Bank actually printed the total volume
of australes necessary to buy the debt, the regulations provided for a gradual  release  of
funds as the project  evolved, thus reducing the  potential for inflation.  Nevertheless, the
program  was discontinued  in the first half of  1989.  Government  officials blamed  this
decision to the explosion of inflation  in Argentina.
16Table  3.  Auction  Discounts  Offered
in  the  Argentine  Swap  Program During  1988
DISC  OUNT  S
Auction  Date
Minimum  Minimum  Maximum  Average
Required
(%)  (%)  (%)  (%)
Public Debt
First  01/20/88  25  35.25  40.20  37.65
Second  03/29/88  35  51.10  57.10  54.15
Third  06/10/88  45  56.15  63.25  58.47
Fourth  09/22/88  45  65.05  69.53  66.17
Private Debt
First  07/04/88  15.00  15.00  15.00
Second  07/28/88  no  13.59  16.10  14.95
Third  09/09/88  minimum  26.00  32.20  27.30
Fourth  10/14/88  requirement  24.05  29.75  27.79
Source:  BCRA
(Banco  Central
de  la  Republica
Argentina)
17Table  4:  Argentina's  Public  Debt  Swap  Auctions,  1988
A  U  C  T  I  O  N  S
Item  /  First  Second  Third  Fourth  TOTAL
1  Value of Investment Projects  101.9  140.0  185.8  102.7  530.4
2  Deductions (imports  funding)  24.7  46.2  87.6  28.3  186.9
3  Net Value of Investment Projects  [1-2]  77.1  93.8  98.2  74.4  343.5
4  Amount Eligible for Conversion  (Mkt. Price)  54.0  54.1  51.2  52.1  211.4
5  Discounted Market Price/$ Face Value  0.30  0.28  0.29  0.24  0.28
6  Rate of Exchange (A/$)  5.00  6.49  10.32  14.70  9.13
7  Discount Offered  36%  54%  58%  66%  0.54
8  Debt to be Converted  (Face  Value)  [4/(1-7)]  84.4  117.7  121.9  153.1  454.6
9  Market Cost of Debt Titles  [8x5]  25.3  32.9  35.3  36.8  126.1
10  Investor Cash Outlay  [1-4]  47.8  85.9  134.6  50.6  319.0
11  EffectiveInvestment  [9+10]  73.2  118.8  169.9  87.4  445.2
12  Investors Gain  [1-11]  28.7  21.2  15.8  15.8  85.2 13  Investors Gain (percentage)  [12/1]x100  28.2%  15.13%  8.53%  14.91%  16.07%
14  Australes Needed  [6x(4+10)]  A509.4  A908.5  A1917.4  A1510.0  A4841.2
15  Implicit Rate  of Exchange  (A /$)  [4/11]  6.96  7.65  11.28  17.28  10.88
16  Government Gain  [8-4]  30.1  63.5  70.7  101.1  243.2
17  Creditor Loss  [8-9]  59.1  84.7  85.5  116.4  328.4
18  Subsidy to Investments  [(15-6)/6]  39.2%  17.8%  9.3%  17.5%  19.1%
a/All figures in US $ millions, except  Source:  Ambito Financiero,  10.13.88
lines 4,5,6,13,14,15 and  18
18Several reasons can  be cited to explain why Argentina chose to use debt swaps
ahead of other alternatives.  Economic  efficiency, financial feasibility and  political viability
were  not considered  simultaneously  in Argentina.  The government followed  a  sequential
aDproach  in selecting the most appropriate financial alternative  given the underlying political
and economic conditions.  The first aspect considered  was political viability.  Political beliefs
imposed restrictions on the range of alternatives  effectively available.  For example,
privatizations were  politically not possible in Argentina until  late  1989.  Strong Congressional
opposition ruled out the  possibility of engaging  in capitalization schemes  (in the form of
privatization of state-owned  enterprises).
Collateralization  was not financially feasible since the government  had  neither the
resources  required for collateral nor international financial institution financing to substitute
for collateral.  Buybacks  were not viable  since the country lacked the funds required to
repurchase  its debt.  Also, the  IFC's initiatives were not substantial  in  Argentina.  Country
and  portfolio funds were  aimed  mainly to the Pacific Rim  developing countries  (Korea,
Malaysia,  Thailand,  the  Philippines, Hong  Kong,  and Singapore).  Only one venture capital
fund (SADICAR)  was located in Argentina.  According  to Van der BijI  (1990) this was
attributable to factors such  as the  nonexistence of a liquid capital market  (which resulted  in
significant divesting difficulties, regulatory shortcomings, and/or the  limited amounts
involved).
In  the case of Argentina two instruments  remained for consideration in 1987,  debt-
equity swaps and  debt-bond swaps.  The Argentine  government decided in favor of debt-
equity swaps.  How appropriate  was the government's  choice  on economic efficiency
grounds?.
For Argentina,  the debt-equity swap  program provided  a market-  oriented  mechanism
to  reduce foreign debt,  increase foreign investment and  restructure  external financing.  The
attractiveness of the scheme was based  on its potential direct and  indirect benefits.  The
Treasury  would experience  a  reduction of interest accruals  up front (direct effect).
Additionally, debt-equity  swaps do not require the expenditure  of the country's  hard  currency
reserves in order to reduce foreign debt.  Since  a debt swap program typically restricts
dividend outflows for some years after a  transaction and there  is no foregone interest income
(because interest-earning foreign exchange reserves are unaffected  by the transaction),  a
swap had the potential for reducing annual debt  servicing costs.
Indirect  (or secondary) effects  occur when the program's  financial  incentives
stimulates the influx of additional foreign investment  (I/D increases),  which can be  channeled
into efficient uses through incentive structures such as different discounts.  For example,
higher direct investment may strengthen the trade balance situation by increasing growth  of
exports and reducing  imports ((X-M)/D  increases).
Finally, the success of swap programs in other Latin American  countries such as Chile
created  a  significant demonstration  effect,  encouraging the participation of banks,  investors,
and government in the Argentine  program.
Authorities also analyzed  the  main problems  involved in  a debt-equity swap strategy.
Theoretically,  if the secondary effects failed to materialize  the swap  program  would  lose
most of its effectiveness.  In that case only direct investment would  be  subsidized (at the
expense of creditor banks).  One could argue that this could happen anyway without the
program.  Exports could fail to grow sufficiently and,  consequently, the trade balance  does
not improve.  In fact,  it may even  deteriorate if new borrowings push interest rates upward.
19This would likely occur when the risk qualification  of the  debtor country worsens as a result
of adverse trends in the debtor country's  balance of payments.  In  general,  the likelihood of
this situation arising depends on the  extent to  which investments made through the scheme
are additional  (i.e., the swap mechanism  is decisive in the  investor's decision to  make the
investment).  If the investments  would  have happened  anyway, the swap only substitutes
foreign debt for new domestic  liabilities.  In this case  the costs would  be  greater than the
potential benefits of the transaction.  While  most of the swap programs  in  Latin America  are
rather  new, many of the  investments made  in Argentina  were in the planning stage for a
considerable time.  This suggests that relatively few investments were additional.  If swaps
do not result in  additional investment in Argentina,  but rather in the exchange of one type of
liability for another  (and often at bargain  prices for the investor),  the  vehicle will not have
been  desirable from  a  macroeconomic  point of view.
But undoubtedly,  the most serious problem from Argentina's  perspective  was the
potential inflationary  pressure posed by the  debt swap program.  In a  swap transaction, the
monetary authority exchanges foreign debt for domestic currency.  If the monetary  authority
does  not have  genuine funds (Central  Bank reserves, Treasury  savings)  in the  amount
necessary  to honor the swap, it will finance the transaction by creating  money, unless this
expansion is properly sterilized." 7 In the absence  of compensatory  measures,  foreign  debt
is reduced at the  expense of domestic debt.
In  an inflationary context such as Argentina's,  it is desirable to keep the effect  of
money creation  low in relation  to the  total money supply.  If this is not achieved the
expansion of the  money supply will have a  direct impact  on the  domestic rate of inflation.  If
the  Fisher effect operates, the subsequent upward  adjustment of interest rates  will act as a
disincentive to investment.1 8 In this situation a  devaluation of the exchange rate  is needed
to  control inflation.  If such adjustment is not done,  the resulting real revaluation  will put a
brake on the rate of growth  of exports and increase  imports,  thus reducing the trade surplus.
Both growth  of interest rates and  reduction of the  trade surplus will increase the  rate of
growth  of debt ratios.
If Argentina's  foreign-exchange  monetary  dilemma  is resolved, there  is still one
additional hurdle.  To the extent that a swap involves converting external  debt into internal
debt there is the  potential for escalation of the  fiscal deficit.  Fiscal  and budgetary deficits are
probably the most important  source of money creation.  The success of Argentina's swap
program  calls for the need  to reduce the fiscal deficit in  proportion to the volume involved in
swap transactions.  The only genuine source of funds to finance the swap  is domestic
savings from  either the  public or the private sector  (i.e.,  reducing consumption).  This
requires GNP to grow faster than consumption,  a  rather  unlikely case for Argentina and  most
debtor countries in  Latin  America.
17  For example,  buying outstanding domestic debt titles in the open market  or reducing the
fiscal deficit through higher public savings (i.e.,  reducing unproductive consumption).
18  According  to the  Fisher effect,  nominal interest  rates  will fully  adjust to  an  increase  in
expected  inflation.  In  order to invest in  a  particular  project investors  require  a  nominal  rate  of
interest sufficiently high for them to earn  an expected real  rate of return. Thus,  an  increase  in
inflation  and the corresponding increase  in  nominal interest  rates will disqualify those projects
that fail to earn the required  (real)  return.
20Conclusions
The usefulness of debt  swaps in providing an  economically efficient and financial
feasible solution to Latin America's  debt repayment problems  and restoring  international
creditworthiness  depends on several conditions.  Countries must demonstrate
1)  an ability of the monetary authority to control the domestic
monetary impacts (control  the money  supply),
2)  an ability of the Treasury to control the fiscal  deficit,
3)  the existence of low inflation  expectations,
4)  the  existence of a small exchange  rate gap,
5)  the existence of a liquid secondary market for debt titles,
6)  simple and transparent  procedures for executing financing
transactions,  and
7)  political stability.
Unfortunately, the Latin  American  experience has proven the unlikeliness of meeting
all these conditions simultaneously.  Brazil,  Mexico and Argentina  have suspended their debt
swap programs citing the need  to control inflation by eliminating the creation of money.
Although they may not be  sufficient to solve the debt problem,  financial innovations
will undoubtedly play an increasingly important role in the  development of practical
resolutions of the excessive foreign debt problem  in Latin  America.  Ultimately,  successful
debt  reduction  strategies will involve a mix of political and financial solutions.
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22Appendix:  The  Argentine  Debt  Swap  Program
The Argentine Government  implemented  its debt-to-equity conversion program  in
1987.  The  main objective was to create  a  lasting  program intended to facilitate  new truly
productive  investments  which would not otherwise be  made.  The main features of the
program  are summarized  here.
Eligibility Criteria
All public and private  sector debt is eligible, except in those cases where the
conversion would trigger a prepayment  obligation or constitute a breach  of any other
provision of the loan agreement.  Eligible investments  include:  1) those whose proceeds  will
be used to purchase  new equipment  or tangible goods, to create  or increase physical
capacity of production plants,  each in order to produce a net increase in the supply of goods;
2) those which, to the extent applicable,  have  received any necessary authorizations  under
the law applicable to foreign investments  in general  (i.e.,  a debt-equity swap is treated just
as a  direct investment under Argentine foreign investment  law) and whose proceeds are  used
in order to  reduce an outstanding long-term  discount facility or a  loan funded by such
facility;19 and  3) other investments  or categories of investments  explicitly approved  by the
Government.  The  Ministerio  de Economia  (ME)  was designated  to review eligibility of all
investments that were submitted to the swap program.
Investor
An investor is any person that  holds eligible debt or causes a foreign  creditor to
present eligible debt to the  BCRA  for conversion.  This  includes Argentine residents.
Investments made  by Argentines  are not subject to Argentine  foreign investment regulations.
Term of Investment
Investors cannot  redeem  or distribute the principal amount of the investment for 10
years from the date of the investment if in foreign currency.  If the investment is
denominated  in australes the term  is three years.
Investors do not have the right to have dividends  remitted  in foreign currency for four
years from the date of the investment.  Remittance of any such previously accrued dividends
after that date  are to  be made over a  minimum of four years in equal semi-annual
installments.  Such remittances  are also be subject to the Argentine laws governing foreign
investment in general.
Matching  Funds
This  provision calls for additional funds to  be assigned to the conversion project.  The
program  originally  required matching  funds on a 1:1  basis (i.e.,  50 percent of the project
cost).  This was later made  more flexible by requiring additional funds for only 30 percent of
the total cost of the investment project.  Matching funds are restricted to include:  a)  capital
investments,  which cannot be  redeemed  or distributed for the minimum  years provided  by
Argentine foreign  investment law;  b) long term  private- source financing  with a minimum
term of six years and a minimum  grace period of four years;  and c) par value of  BONEX
19 A long-term discount instrument is an instrument  maturing at least two years after the date
of the swap transaction.
23(government bonds denominated  in dollars)  purchased  in the primary market from  BCRA (Banco  Central  de  la  Republica Argentina)  at .96 of par value.
In  every case half of the funds must  be either project loans disbursed by the  IFC  and the  International  Investment Corporation  or funds disbursed in accordance  with generally applicable government  regulations outside of Argentina.  The term of these funds cannot be less than  18 months.  The  investor's request for conversion  must be accompanied  by a precise statement of the project's matching  funds.
Available Amounts
The government  has  set annual quotas for the first five years of the debt-to-equity conversion program  and limits of conversion rights covering two-month  periods within each year.  Such  quotas and  limits reflect the existing  economic  conditions2 0 and may be modified by the  ME after providing a 60-day notice.
Previous quotas were  scheduled as follows:
Year  Annual  Quota
(million)
First  1987-1988  (from 07/01/87)  $300
Second  1988-1989  $400
Third  1989-1990  $400
Fourth  1990-1991  $400
Fifth  1991-1992  $400
Total  1987-1992  $1,900
Source:  BCRA
To the extent a limit or quota  is not used in  a  particular two-month  period or year,  the unused portion may be added to the quota  for the following period.
Conversion  Procedure
All conversion requests  are submitted  to the  BCRA  and  must be accompanied  by a copy of the approval by the office  designated within the  ME,  and a certification that the required matching  funds are  available.  These conversion  requests  may be made  by an intermediary  bank or by the  investor and must be  accompanied  by a  performance  guaranty issued by the  intermediary  bank in the amount of one percent of the debt to be  converted or by an  interest deposit in  that amount to be made to the account of the  BCRA.  Such guaranty  or deposit is fully refundable and  serves as collateral that the eligible debt and matching  funds are delivered.
20  For example,  if inflation is expected,  a  reduction in  the quota  will likely take  place.
24If requests exceed the limit set for a particular  period,  conversion rights are awarded
to those investors who offer the greatest discount (in australes to be  received).  Special
procedures  may be developed  for large industrial projects.  Depending  on the scope of the
project,  consideration may be  given to modifying the  relevant limits or targets.
Conversions  are made through  presentation  to the BCRA  of the eligible debt by the
investor or the  intermediary bank.  The  BCRA  buys the debt vehicles at the free market rate
of exchange.  In this way, the  swap program  is independent from  changes in the exchange
rate gap.  The australes received  in  exchange for such  debt remain  on deposit with the
intermediary  bank until they are disbursed in connection  with the  investment.  This deposit is
subject to a 100 percent reserve requirement.  The investor receives accrued interest  on the
eligible debt until the date of conversion.  After conversion,  australes on deposit bear interest
at the  unregulated  interest rate for deposits in australes  or, at the option of the investor,
indexed at the  official rate  of exchange to the US  dollar and  bear the  LIBOR  interest rate.
The schedule  for disbursements is included  and approved when the eligibility of the
investment is approved.  Disbursements  may be made  by the intermediary  bank in
accordance  with the schedule,  provided that the bank has received satisfactory proof that
the  costs reflected  in the  schedule have  been incurred.  After each such  disbursement of
australes the intermediary  bank certifies to the  BCRA  that the australes have  been  invested in
the  project.
25